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“Beauty is the normal state.” (Ralph Waldo Emerson , The Conduct of Life) 
 
“There can be no such thing as an eclectic philosophy, but there can be 
eclectic philosophers. But an eclectic is anyone who, from whatever exists 
and is happening round about, appropriates the things he or she finds 
congenial to her or his nature; and this context validly includes all that 
can be called culture and progress in a theoretical and practical sense. It 
follows that two eclectic philosophers could turn into the greatest 
opponents if they are antagonistic to one another, each picking out 
whatever suits him or her in every traditional system of philosophy. 
(Goethe, Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years)   
   
 
When critics label Goethe's scientific work “literary” or “artistic”, they seem to have 
little more in mind than a dismissive gesture towards its alleged “subjectivity”, or 
perhaps towards the beauty of Goethe's illustrations, or, more frequently, the often-
noted, though unanalysed, power of his language. But Goethe thinks there is more, 
much more, to “taste” (Geschmack) than appreciation of merely formalistic qualities. 
He holds that aesthetic perception yields the most comprehensive knowledge humanly 
available; indeed, for him, as for Nietzsche (Bishop and Stephenson 2001), aesthetic 
experience is the norm against which all other kinds of knowing must be adjudged, 
and without which human life is robbed of any intrinsic meaning. He  clearly sees his 
own scientific work as a contribution to what might be called, following Alexander 
Baumgarten's original formulation of 1750, the “science of aesthetics”: “the beautiful 
is a manifestation of the mysterious laws of nature, which, were it not for the beautiful 
phenomenon, would be hidden from us eternally” (Goethe [1907] 1976, 47). For 
Goethe, as for A. N. Whitehead, “an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience”; and 
“all aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of the relation of contrast under 
identity” (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 280). The metaphysical tenet that underlies 
Goethe’s scientific method is, in this respect at least, indistinguishable from the 
Process Philosophy articulated by Whitehead and his followers: “the metaphysical 
doctrine here expounded,” writes Whitehead in his Process and Reality, “finds the 
foundations of the world in the aesthetic experience, rather than – as with Kant – in 
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the cognitive and conceptual experience. All order is therefore aesthetic order. … The 
actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order” (Whitehead 1927, 91-92). 
This essay is an attempt to identify the cultural significance of Goethe's scientific 
writings. My aim is not to argue for the validity of either Goethe's findings or his 
ideas. The latter are, as H. B. Nisbet's Goethe and the Scientific Tradition 
convincingly demonstrated over thirty years ago, in any case largely derivative; 
and the former continue to be controversial amongst those competent to judge, 
the scientific community and its historians. My concern here is rather with the 
abiding, indeed increasing, significance of Goethe's method of acquiring and 
transmitting meaningful knowledge. What follows consists in a re-reading of a 
selection of Goethe's writings on nature and culture, against a background-
sketch of the long historical perspective he himself set them in, as an appropriate 
cultural response to what he held was the inherently reproductive character of 
life. Natural phenomena, in Goethe's view, provoke cultural reproduction: a 
natural object is, as he puts it, something that elicits re-presentation (“das 
Darzustellende”).  Intensely aware, long before Bergson, of the severe distortions 
made by the essentially spatial metaphors with which discursive language 
operates, Goethe, I suggest, deployed a novel mode of writing (theoretically 
elaborated by Schiller during their collaboration as “aesthetic discourse” - 
schöner Vortrag) in order to re-enact in language at least something of the 
complex interchange in natural and cultural process, while at the same time 
describing with eminent clarity the character of its products. My indebtedness to 
a whole array of scholars, whose primary aim - of arguing for the scientific 
respectability of Goethe's various “discoveries” - is not my own, will be clear 
below. 
In order to dispel the cloud hanging over Goethe’s scientific writings in the still 
commonplace description, “Goethe's Romantic approach to science”1, it is 
                                                 
1 The formulation is taken from Frazee, 1978, 63-68  (p. 63). The author is quite frank  
about having derived his impression of Goethe's science from browsing through the  
secondary literature. Cf. Richards, 2002, 563-4. 
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helpful, if their true cultural significance is to be appreciated, to evoke the 
reception of Goethe's activity as a scientist, in particular of his criticism of 
Newton in its immediate cultural context. It is one of the many ironies of 
Goethe's reception that, just as Erich Heller's famous book, The Disinherited 
Mind, was popularising old-fashioned, nineteenth-century positivistic 
condemnations of his scientific work (claiming that Goethe “made no 
contribution to scientific progress or technique,” and that Goethe and modern 
science “never met”; Heller 1961, 7 & 11), scientists of distinction were returning 
to Goethe, drawn both by the suggestiveness of his methodology and the simple 
fact, now generally acknowledged, that he had made several significant 
discoveries.  Indeed, he has been cited throughout the twentieth-century by 
reputable authorities as the conceptual progenitor of several important 
developments in various fields. Several factors have contributed to this 
rehabilitation of Goethe's scientific work in the twentieth century. The increased 
awareness in the scientific community itself of the limitations of Newtonian 
mechanistic models, coupled with a greater sense of the history of science, has 
undoubtedly played its part; as has the Popperian recognition that the kind of 
mistakes Goethe made are “matters of no consequence”(Arber, 1946, 4), since 
refutation of error is seen as essential to the progress of science. Relevant, too, is 
the increasingly evident historical fact that “by pursuing independent paths of 
inquiry we [in the twentieth century] have recaptured and developed many of the 
perceptionist insights first gained by the eighteenth century” (Flavell, 1970, 16). 
Not least, the growing confirmation of some of even Goethe's optical findings has 
done a great deal to re-establish his historical reputation in science itself 
(Burwick, 1986, 23; Rehbock, 1995, 388-89). 
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By contrast, throughout the nineteenth century Goethe's science was by and 
large dismissed and forgotten as the dilettante dabblings of a great poet who 
regretfully wasted so much time on irrelevant matters (Wells, 1978, 125-6).  After 
about 1840 Goethe's scientific writings were almost totally neglected 
(Wachsmuth, 1941, 6), until Raymond Du Bois’s Address as Principal of Berlin 
University in 1882, “Goethe without End”, which contained, however, only a 
fundamental critique of Goethe's fruitless amateurism (Benn, 1942, 466). The 
1830s marked the high point of his scientific reputation before the twentieth 
century. Geoffroy de Sainte-Hilaire's favourable report on the Metamorphosis of 
Plants to the Academy of Paris in 1831 gave Goethe great personal pleasure. In 
1833 John Lindley acknowledged Goethe's scientific contribution in morphology 
in a lecture to the British Association for the Advancement of Science; and, in 
1837, William Whewell praised Goethe's work in biology and anatomy (Burwick, 
1986, 4). The quite positive reception in England of the Metamorphosis did 
something to mitigate the negative impression that Goethe's anti-Newtonian 
stance had created (Wolf, 1952-53, 101). His work on colour had to contend with 
the British scientific establishment's idolatory of Newton, given perhaps its 
fullest expression in Sir David Brewster's hagiographic study of Sir Isaac. In 
such a cultural climate, his, and Thomas Young's, savagely hostile reviews were, 
perhaps, inevitable (Burwick, 1986, 32-34). By contrast, in Russia, where 
positivistic science was on much less firm a footing - and where the intelligentsia 
were, in any case, prone to a definite cultural Germanophilia - his scientific work 
was better received than in either Britain or Germany, or even France, especially 
at Moscow University.  Long before Hegenbauer in the early twentieth century 
in Germany acknowledged the significance of Goethe's Morphologie, his 
biological ideas had a positive influence in Russian scientific literature.  He had, 
too, in this regard a profound effect on writers such as Alexander Herzen. Such 
interest as was sustained in Goethe's science in nineteenth-century Germany, as 
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well as England, was due in very large part to G.H.Lewes' sympathetic though 
ultimately critical account in his biography of 1856 (Petzschner, 1976, 384-5). 
In the twentieth century, Goethe's opposition to Newton has been variously cited 
as paradigmatic of serious problems confronting the modern mind.  He has been 
enlisted, for example, as a mediator in the “Two-Cultures” debate initiated by 
C.P.Snow (Schwedes, 1975, 64). And he has also been identified as a champion of 
historico-genetic thought in its struggle with formalism (Kaufmann, I, 1985, 35-
41). This has gone some way towards saving him for those more obscurantist of 
his admirers who would make him over into a projection of their own, often 
quite ill-informed, fears of what they think science is about. But in the nineteenth 
century what led to his being enthusiastically received in theosophical circles in 
Russia (as a mystagogue!) contributed very substantially in the Western 
scientific community to his writings' being rejected; especially so in Britain, 
where to many “anti-Newtonian” was simply synonymous with mysticism, 
mesmerism, magnetism and all the other hocuspocus associated with 
Naturphilosophie (Burwick, 1986, 34; cf. Schöne, 1987, 64-69).  Coleridge who 
had long thought Newton's optics “monstrous fictions”, before, as he claimed, he 
had ever heard of Goethe, was quite exceptional in not identifying Goethe's 
critique with that obscurantism which he gradually began to suspect in Schelling 
(Burwick, 1986, 54 & 242). For the overwhelming majority of Goethe's readers 
in the nineteenth century his anti-Newton stance could mean only one thing: 
transcendentalism, attractive to some, repellant to others. 
 
Just as Goethe strove in his biological studies to integrate in one method the 
formalistic approach of Linnaeus and Cuvier with the genetic approach he found 
in Rousseau, Herder and later Geoffroy de Sainte Hilaire, so, too, he strove to 
strike a pragmatic balance between what he regarded as the complementary 
heresies of the mechanistic cosmology of Newtonianism and the organicistic 
speculations of his Romantic contemporaries: 
All effects...that we observe in the world of experience are interrelated in 
 6
the most constant manner....It is inevitable...that we should separate them 
and contrast them with one another;  but this necessarily created an 
endless conflict in the sciences.  Stubborn analytical pedantry and 
indiscriminate mysticism both do equal damage. (Goethe 1947: I, 8, 232) 
When pursued exclusively both of these modes of thought hinder the progress of 
knowledge: “either one brings together and connects, in the gloom of fantasy and 
with the cunning of mysticism, things that are worlds apart, or one isolates what 
belongs together by a disintegrating, in reality unintelligent, analytical 
procedure...”. (Goethe 1947: I, 9, 347) Like both Newton and the 
Naturphilosophen, Goethe was a grateful heir to the full sweep of the scientific 
tradition; not just to the post-Galileo empiricist strand, but to what might be 
designated as the hermetic tradition, embracing magic and alchemy, from the 
likes of Paracelsus and Jakob Böhme, and the mystical tradition proper, via 
Nicholas de Cusa and Giordano Bruno amongst others.  Unlike, say, Schelling, 
however, Goethe did not conflate the immanence of scientific inquiry with 
transcendental speculation. Characteristically, he rejected just those 
“superstitious” elements of alchemy that fascinated many a Romantic (Goethe 
1982, 14:78); Böhme's equation of light with the divinity held  no interest for 
him.  But, unlike the Newton of scientific legend, he remained true to the world 
of sense-qualities (Goethe 1947:I, 6, 300), and in so doing, he felt he was also 
being true to the majestically ambitious values that had animated the history of 
science in the West. 
And he never makes any secret of the fact that in his scientific endeavours, as 
elsewhere, he is drawing on others;  lifting quite happily, not only from the 
Ancients (Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Plotinus, in particular) and the Moderns 
(Spinoza, Leibniz, Shaftesbury), but also from his contemporaries:  from his 
friends (Herder, Schiller) and from his foes (Naturphilosophen - even Newton!) 
alike.  Although he was proud of the fact that (since he was not a university 
teacher) he had no reason to cow-tow to conventional wisdom, and despite his 
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conviction that some understanding of nature was possible without knowledge of 
tradition (Goethe 1947, I, 11, 180), he argues that if such knowledge is to attain 
the status of science, it is absolutely vital to integrate one's individual work with 
that of one's contemporaries and predecessors in the relevant field.  His own 
eclectic indebtedness to the Neo-Platonic, Empirical, and Rationalist traditions 
still-flourishing in his own age for theoretical orientation has been clearly 
demonstrated (Nisbet, 1972).  Examination of his statements of scientific 
principle reveals, too, that they can be traced to crucial stages in the historical 
development of scientific and technological thought.  Indeed Goethe appears to 
be consciously restating precisely those contributions to the tradition which have 
become its commonplaces.  It is perhaps hardly surprising that a thinker who 
placed so much emphaiss on process and the genetic method should also have 
evinced such a pronounced sense of history.  Just as the employment of the 
genetic method in morphology enhances clarity of perception, by virtue of the 
comparisons it enables one to make between different stages of development, so 
tracing change through the past of human affairs illuminates understanding of 
the present.  Though he is adamantly opposed to historicism, in the sense of 
absolutising and privileging the context of origin (to Eckermann, 15 October 
1825), he is convinced that judgement is impossible without due historical 
perspective. “The history of science is science itself,” he declared in an essay of 
1820 (Goethe 1947, I, 8, 157). While naive perception of nature is, of course, 
entirely possible (and, to some extent, fruitful), “the conflict of the individual 
with the immediacy of experience and with mediated tradition is, in fine, history 
of the sciences” (Goethe 1982, 14, 51). And he was by no means exceptional in his 
age in this awareness of the history of science. The traditional positions in the 
history of (Newtonian) science and scientific method were available, in Germany 
as elsewhere in Europe in the eighteenth century, in the form of translations 
(from the English, French, Dutch and Italian), in the many compendia of science 
(such as Johann Gottlieb Buhle's grandiose 1810 History of the Arts and Sciences 
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from their Renaissance up to the end of the Eighteenth Century), in scientific 
periodicals, and in the wide use made of these themes by popular poets and 
writers (Schatzberg 1973, 325).  The sheer variety and quantity of such 
compendia and manuals (many of which went into several editions) indicates the 
familiarity of the eighteenth-century reading public with at least the (orthodox) 
tenets of traditional scientific thinking, even if, as Goethe pointed out, such 
collections were a source of the “immortalisation of error” (Goethe [1907] 1976, 
89). 
In what is itself part of Goethe's inheritance from the Enlightenment, he 
dramatises social and cultural history in terms of alternating progressive and 
retrograde periods, in which he seeks, as in his morphology, a pattern of 
recurrence.  In the case of the history of science, he discerns two tendencies at 
work from its earliest recorded history, which he identifies by associating the one 
with Plato, the other with Aristotle (HA, 14, 54f).  These two poles – “two 
parties” (Goethe 1982, 14, 55) - provide the dynamic of scientific progress,  “the 
driving force” of science-history (Fink, 1991, 53), and it is to the credit of his own 
age, Goethe contends, that the two are still held in (albeit precarious) balance. 
That Goethe himself was attracted by, indeed felt an affinity for, the Aristotelian 
tendency (Wachsmuth 1941, 16) in no way affects the balanced presentation he 
offers in his Theory of Colours of these two poles - the “Platonic” - mechanistic 
(that is, tending to abstraction) and the “Aristotelian” - dynamic (tending to 
concretion) - at work in the development of Western science (Groth 1972, 60).  In 
fact, the whole narrative he intends to retell, he announces early on in the 
“Historical Section”, is merely a “commentary” (Goethe 1982, 14, 58) on this 
dramatic story of the interplay over centuries of these two opposing modes of 
thought: 
 
It is, then, my duty to unfold before the eyes of the lover of nature-and-
history, the story of how in the modern era the Platonic and Aristotelian 
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convictions have again come to the surface, how they have been variously 
repressed or exploited, perfected or distorted, and how, through a 
singular fluctuation of ancient and modern types of opinion, the topic has 
been pushed from one side to the other, until finally, at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, it has been completely displaced (Goethe 1982, 14, 
56). 
Oppositions for Goethe are only rarely alternatives; rather each is a reciprocal 
supplementary activity for the other.  
Clearly, such a view of history is cyclical - or, rather, helical - in conception, as 
he points out at the very beginning of his account: 
 
The circle that mankind must tread, is sufficiently limited and, despite the 
great standstill that barbarism effected, has more than once completed 
its course.  If we ascribe to it, in addition, a spiral movement, then it 
return recurrently to places it has already passed through.  All true views 
and all errors are repeated on this path (Goethe 1982, 14, 7). 
Innovation, then, for Goethe consists in the refinement and transformation of 
inherited thought; rather than coming out of nowhere, a scienza nuova, a view 
that had been the received wisdom since at least Nicolo Tartaglia, the sixteenth-
century mathematician, had coined the phrase to designate the positivistic 
sciences (and that is still current enough today to be asserted as self-evident by a 
recent writer on science, described as having “suddenly exploded all about us”; 
Appleyard 1992, 4).  Progress is conceived by Goethe as a move from general to 
ever more specific, with recourse to theorising only when enhanced conceptual 
subtlety is required to account for the increase in detailed knowledge (Goethe 
1982, 13, 64).  Like any other human enterprise, science (as he also remarked to 
Eckermann, 23 October 1828) is characterised by regressions: “The sciences 
have developed in a remarkable way, but by no means in a steady progress, not 
even step-by-step;  but rather through ups and downs, through linear or helical 
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progressions and regressions” (Goethe 1982, 14, 58). Moreover, the historical 
record is full of lacunae (Goethe 1982, 14, 51), which make the anyway highly 
problematic business of writing history (Goethe 1982, 13, 320) even more 
difficult.  What is provided in the “Historical Section” is readily acknowledged 
as no more than a “sketch” (Skizze; Goethe 1982, 14, 55) whose redeeming value 
is that it outlines those “crucial turning-points” (Hauptmomente; Goethe 1982, 
14, 56) in the history of colour theory that were already known to the Greeks 
(though the ideas of Pre-Socratics and post-Aristotelians had their influence only 
late in the Renaissance) - key ideas, the knowledge of which in historical 
development is essential to understanding the present (as he remarked to von 
Müller in 1827, noted in the latter's diary on 23 August). 
Goethe is keen, then, to emphasize that both aspects of the tradition, the one he is 
personally opposed to as much as the one to which he adheres, are alike prone to 
degenerate, unless and until stimulated by their complementary into renewed life 
- that is to say, into dealing with nature as problematic, and with science as 
historical.  It is, in fact, much the same conviction as that which has guided 
contemporary historians of science:  “the history of science,” writes Popper, 
“should be treated not as a history of theories, but as a history of problem-
situations and their modifications, (sometimes imperceptible, sometimes 
revolutionary)” (Popper 1972, 177).  Any mode of thought, including the 
dynamic outlook Goethe attributes to the Aristotelian school, becomes pernicious 
when it claims hegemony, something it is far less likely to do if alive to the 
history of its subject: the rejection of the past, and the consequent temporal 
parochialism, of much of modern exact science derives, in Goethe's view, in large 
part from its illusory view of itself as utterly unprecedented, an arrogance which 
is then extended to its treatment of nature (Goethe 1947, II, 6, 189). 
This needful historical dimension Goethe builds in to his scientific writing - 
indeed, into a great deal of his non-scientific writing, too - by means of those 
ubiquitous articulations of general principles, broadly methodological in nature, 
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that are a striking feature of the presentation of his findings.  He does nothing to 
disguise the fact they are derived from tradition; and it is not the case, as has 
been argued, that he occasionally “extricates” a thought from the esoteric 
Neoplatonic, or hermetic, tradition and then employs it in the exoteric realm of 
science (Schneider 1979, 466).  Rather he thinks that such (often contradictory) 
ideas are part-and-parcel of that tradition.  It is for example wholly typical of 
Goethe's method and manner to introduce his “Metamorphosis of Plants” with 
the observation that “the secret affinity of the various external parts of the plant 
[his topic]... has in general long since been recognized by investigators”(Goethe 
1982, 13, 64). Such perceptions constitute the “crucial moments” 
(Hauptmomente) the Greeks already knew; in his work they are assimilated as 
what the German eighteenth century called Maximen (“maxims”, “principles”, 
“laws”) guiding activity. The briefest survey of some of Goethe's characteristic 
statements of principle demonstrate that he is equally indebted to the 
“mechanistic” (that is, “Newtonian” tradition) and to the “dynamic” school of 
thought; and serves to illustrate his determination to situate his own scientific 
work at the bi-polar centre of the Western scientific tradition (Stephenson, 1995, 
35-45). 
Indeed, wherever we turn in Goethe's scientific texts we come across the re-
affirmation of general principles traceable through the whole length of the three 
thousand years of scientific tradition evoked in his History of the Theory of 
Colours; and, once they are traced, they turn out very often to be associated with 
names that are remembered in scientific history for precisely the methodological 
innovation Goethe is rewriting (such as Roger Bacon or Roger Grosseteste; 
Goethe [1907] 1976, 200 & 113-14). What may appear to be no more than mere 
name-dropping is, in fact, the deft employment of the rhetorical figure of 
antonomasia (the use of a proper name to express a general idea) as an 
argumentative gambit. 
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Goethe's principal aim as a historian of science is to bring home, by embedding 
his own convictions in the twin strands of Western science, that his own 
approach, far from being marginal or eccentric, has throughout almost the 
whole length of that tradition, been an integral part of its inner dialectic. The 
marginalization of sensuous perception, he seeks to show, is a deplorable 
consequence of the undue reliance placed on analysis and rationalisation that has 
increasingly characterised Western thought and culture in the modern, that is 
the post-Renaissance, era, of which Newton is the outstanding, Titanic, 
representative.  It is demonstrably untrue that Goethe went to work innocent of, 
or even repudiating, the preconceptions of modern science (Schrimpf 1977, 132). 
If Goethe's science is “in opposition to exact science”, it is so only in the sense of 
a complementary polarity supplementing it, not a competing alternative. After 
all his Theory of Colour contains (in the section, “Sensuous-Ethical Effects of 
Colour”) a “not inconsiderable portion” of classical mathematics, in its 
“symmetrical ordering according to polar relations” (Heissenberg 1967, 422), 
and his whole scientific oeuvre is informed by the principles of modern science 
(Seamon & Zajonc 1998, ii-x). Goethe's anxiety is that the - to his mind, 
historically necessary - modern rapprochement between the mechanistic mode 
and the organistic is, in part because of external socio-cultural factors, too long 
in coming, with the consequence that claims to knowledge that are every bit as 
important as those of positive science seem to lack validity in a climate of opinion 
one-sidedly quantitative in outlook.  He had no pretensions whatsoever to 
originality in this campaign; as he told Eckermann, 16 December 1828, “my 
theory of colour is no complete innovation”. As a pupil of Herder's he was well 
aware, for instance, of Vico's protest against the suppression of the concrete 
quality of things, leaving only numbers and number relations (following Galileo's 
reduction of physics to its “first part”, mechanics).  But, convinced that historical 
awareness of the past has the supreme value of provoking and enabling us to 
project into the future, thus giving to present activity the “ethical” (sittlich) 
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responsibility of evaluation - he has hopes that the longed-for reconciliation of 
quantitative and qualitative modes of knowing will yet come about.  But he is 
realistic enough to know that the enterprise is fraught with appalling difficulty.  
It is not just that, while a sense of history may well help guard against undue 
subjectivity, it can of itself do nothing to overcome the hypothetical impossibility 
of objective knowledge, the subject-object divide. Equally daunting is the fact, as 
Goethe sees it, that the swing from one pole to another in scientific outlook 
brings with it a subtle and all-pervasive change, not simply in the terminology of 
the specialist subject, but also in the metaphors (and thus the models) that come 
to dominate human thought.  The outlook dominant in any given period in 
history insinuates itself into scientific and wider discourse, as the norm: “all 
taxonomies”, he notes, “closely examined, turn out to be taken from the 
prevailing point of view”(Goethe 1982, 68). Clearly, Goethe's strategy needed to 
be two-pronged if he was to help shift the linguistically-embedded prejudice of 
one-sided Newtonianism: on the one hand, to find a way of giving expression in 
discourse to qualitative knowledge; on the other, to articulate a validating 
account of the reliability of such knowledge. Of course, the two desiderata are 
intertwined. But the epistemological challenge is the more urgent, simply 
because, as he put it in a reflection edited after his death: 
 
When ways of looking disappear from the world, the objects perceived 
often go missing too.  In fact one can say that, in a higher sense, the way of 
looking is the object (Goethe [1907] 1976, 198). 
 
This openness to the whole gamut of traditional thought is Goethe’s response to 
the challenge that he himself threw out to the modern world in one of his most 
famous aphorisms, taken from his novel of 1829, Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman 
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Years: “Everything worth thinking has already been thought; our endeavour 
must be to think it through again” (Goethe [1907] 1976, 93). 
It is the fruit, as Paul Stöcklein pointed out (Goethe 1963, 9, 742-43), of his 
“conversation” with his intellectual predecessors. It also helps explain the striking 
resonance of his thinking that continues into our own day in apparently quite 
diverse thinkers, themselves equally grateful heirs to the same traditions (Böhme, 
67-8). In any case, the growth of the history of ideas in the latter half of the 
twentieth century has “rediscovered” ideas that were accepted notions in the 
eighteenth.  
But at least equally significant is the second part of the aphorism above: “thinking 
through inherited thought” for Goethe, as for Schiller, is a matter, not just of 
conceptual abstraction, but of aesthetic concretization. In fact, the insistence on 
the crucial role of sensitivity to the material medium in the achievement of an 
organistic understanding of the world is the defining characteristic of the temper 
of the aesthetic, scientific, and broader cultural, theory of Weimar Classicism. The 
movement of Weimar Classical thought is from general to particular, away from 
the characteristic “scene of Romantic art … the play with abstractions … and with 
disembodied forms and patterns” (Heller 1968, 129-30).  The human mind, Goethe 
argues, while enjoying the elevation of high abstraction, longs for the particular, 
without losing a universal perspective (Goethe 1982, 12, 84).  It is the function of 
the aesthetic to provide this stereoscopic perspective by “epitomising” human 
significance in a particular form (Goethe 1982, 12, 297).   It is, of course, the 
business of reflection to subject aesthetic perceptions to intellectual analysis; but 
not to displace them with the resultant conceptual entities — a reifying tendency 
common, in Goethe's view, to   Romanticism and Newtonianism alike. And 
wherever decisive deviation from Platonic abstraction as the ultimate goal of the 
life of the mind is detectable in thinking about nature and culture, we may well be 
justified in suspecting at least a continuing trace of the genealogical chain of ideas 
to which Goethe and Schiller felt their own project belonged. In respect of the 
cultural discussion that has followed that of Goethe and Schiller, evidence of a 
similar, non-Platonic, valuation of aesthetic experience as yet higher than 
intellectual insight may well indicate the filiation of their characteristic thought. 
Everything depends in this context on the morphology of ideas, as distinct from 
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merely verbal likeness. That is to say, it would seem reasonable to assume that, 
where the form of conceptualisation in Weimar Classicism and in a later writer is 
similar, it is possible to discern shared (and often demonstrably linked)  
participation in a perennial concern with aesthetic value (Stephenson, 2005). 
Goethe speaks of his own heuristic methodology as the projection onto the external 
world of an “intimated rule”: “there is something unknown, yet lawful, in the object 
which corresponds to something unknown, yet lawful, in the subject” (Goethe [1907] 
1976, 69, and 227). There is not much doubt that this is Pre-Socratic. It is certainly not 
Schellingian; the “unknown”, whatever else it is, is not an Idea, an object of rational 
cognition. It is, rather, precisely what Goethe calls it, an imaginative heuristic tool that 
directs attention to the world.  But since it is “unknown”, it can scarcely be the basic 
component of his theory of knowledge that some have seen in it. Like Spinoza's 
thought, the Pre-Socratic doctrine is functioning here as a congenial framework for 
Goethe; and, as in the case of Spinoza's metaphysics, “all particularities escape [it]” 
(Goethe to F. H. Jacobi, 9 June 1785). The essence of reification2 for Goethe is to 
mistake abstract disembodied structure for concrete, embodied form.  Looking for the 
Universal qua abstraction in the Particular is, for him, always such an act of reification, 
since the particular and the universal are, from the standpoint of aesthetic perception, 
simply names for aspects of a concrete reality. Intellectual certainty is, for him, a 
category-mistake; the Pre-Socratic formula of an (unknown) Self finding itself in an 
(unknown) Nature is merely an adumbration of the problem as are all such abstract 
formulae – and no solution. 
Certainty is rather an aesthetic quality of embodied feeling, a valuation that occurs at 
every level of interaction between subject and object. The pure abstraction to which 
Platonists aspire is, for Goethe, simply impossible to attain: both what he calls the 
“empirical” and the “scientific” phenomena retain something of the sensuous matrix – 
the concrete context of origin and growth - in which each has its birth. This is what 
he had learned as a practising artist. A successful work of art re-presents traces 
of lived experience in the meaningfully interconnected array of the textured 
surface of its physical medium, whether in paint or marble, in the sound and 
look of language, or in the undulating figurations of the dancer’s body. It is, in his 
view, only sensible, therefore, that human thought in every area of study should take 
                                                 
2 Literally, “Ver-ding-lichung”: “making a thing” of what is but a mental entity.  
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account of the medium in which it operates. For this reason, his chosen term for the 
highest perception (of   the “pure phenomenon”) – Anschauung (“aesthetic intuition”) 
– also does duty for any, or all, of the instances of sensuous perception that occur 
within the open-ended, cyclical, process of ever more specific (and ever more 
theorized) insight which underlies his own scientific method – just as 
“Understanding” (Verstand)  and “Reason” (Vernunft)  will do duty for each other, in 
order to indicate similarly the continuous refinement of intellect that necessarily 
accompanies this procedure (Goethe [1907] 1976, 167). Although Goethe agrees with 
modern science that the senses are fallible, he does not join in its headlong flight from 
the sensuous world (Heisenberg 1967, 425). Standing in a tradition that has continued 
into the twentieth century,3 Goethe calls, by analogy with Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, for a “Critique of the Senses”: 
 
           Kant has drawn our attention to the fact that there is a Critique of Reason, 
           that this – the highest faculty we possess – has cause to be self-aware.  
           What great advantages this voice has brought, everyone will have tested,  
            it is to be hoped, in respect in themselves. I, however, would, in the same 
           spirit, like to throw down the challenge that a Critique of the Senses is  
           necessary. (Goethe [1907] 1976, 97) 
His play here on the homonym Sinn (which translates well enough into the English 
“sense”) underlines Goethe’s conviction that meaning is fundamentally, and 
intrinsically, sensuous. What saves this epistemological stance from collapsing into 
solipsism is the constitutive, formative, function he ascribes to the objective medium 
of the senses, which, for the artist and investigator of nature alike, consists in the 
physical, bodily experience of the aesthetic phenomenon, either actual or imagined ( 
or remembered). Feeling arises when sensuous impression is answered by evaluative 
response, whether it  be visceral or visual.  For Goethe, meaningless experience is a 
contradiction in terms.  Nature speaks to us through our senses, he tells us, in the 1810 
Preface to his Theory of Colours – perhaps the most magnificent passage in the whole 
of his scientific writings – famously defining colours as “the acts of light, acts and 
sufferings” (Taten des Lichts, Taten und Leiden):  
                                                 
3 Process-philosophy aspires to “a critique of pure feeling” (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 158). 
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Close your eyes, prick up your ears, and from the softest sound to the wildest 
noise, from the simplest tone to the highest harmony, from the most violent, 
passionate scream to the gentlest words of sweet reason, it is but Nature who speaks, 
revealing her being, her power, her life, and her relatedness, so that a blind person, to 
whom the infinitely visible world is denied, can grasp an infinite vitality in what can 
be heard. (Goethe 1982, 13:315) 
In an essay written in 1792, entitled “Experiment as Mediator between Object 
and Subject”, Goethe outlined his position in respect of experimentation.  His 
interest lies, not so much in testing a theory, nor primarily in what he calls the 
“scientific phenomena” (Goethe 1982, 13, 25); but, like Francis Bacon's, in 
increasing his knowledge of the living phenomenon in all its given contingency 
(Wells, 1978, 103-4). Goethe gave himself all possible trouble and took the 
greatest care to convince  himself of the reliability of facts by means of accurate 
and sustained experiments before re-submitting them to his mind as matter for 
reflection.  By sticking close to the object in its  setting, Goethe seeks to avoid any 
arbitrary connections the imagination might be tempted to make. In his 
experiments the faculty of memory - the imagination in its “imitative” modality - 
has a crucial role, assimilating experience and putting it into sequential order - 
an Er-innerung (an “innering”), as Hegel was later to call such retentive 
assimilation. Having first observed the phenomenon in its immediate 
environment, noting its relations with other forms, Goethe then studies it under 
varying experimental conditions (Nisbet, 1972, 38 & 40). In order to study the 
dynamics of this complex of experiments he imagines it as a successive series in 
time, each stage imaginatively “derived” (abgeleitet – “abducted” - is his term), 
extending backwards (and sometimes forwards) from the “pregnant point” 
(Goethe 1982, 13, 40) at which complexity of interrelationship reaches its highest 
degree of intricacy. His rationale for adopting this procedure is quite simply 
pragmatic: it is the one way of conceptualising the distinctive “character” a 
phenomenon has taken on through time. What Goethe is seeking to do in his 
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experimentation is to recapture, in heightened detail, the glimpse of living form 
gained in earlier, fleeting aesthetic perception: an experiment is the setting-up of 
conditions which make the aesthetic structure of an object again manifest.  It is 
not just a test of theory; more a proof of perception.  As he told Jacobi (29 
December 1794), he strives “to catch phenomena, to hold them fast in 
experiments”; in fact, the aesthetic form of some phenomena (such as the 
rainbow) is clearer under experimental conditions than in nature itself (letter to 
Boisserée, 11 January 1832).  The whole point of Goethe's experimentation is, 
then, Darstellung - “representation of an object, brought into relation with others 
in such a way that its significance is revealed” (Arber 1946, 85): 
 
If we deliberately reproduce the experience of our predecessors, or  
 experiences which we or others at the same time as ourselves have 
gained, and reconstruct (wieder darstellen) phenomena which arose 
 partly by chance, and partly by design, we call this an experiment. 
(Goethe 1982, 13, 14) 
So the aesthetic phenomenon is revisited in experiment, but now its appreciation   
is heightened by a much more exact grasp of detail.   
 
The geometric shapes that the mind lends to objects, the phenomena, strictly speaking, 
do not have; the latter exist rather in clusters constituted by their prehension of each 
other. And these relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just 
as much matters of sensuous apprehension as the things themselves. Phenomena 
endure by repetition of pattern, or better rhythm, of relations – by form, which is the 
diagram, as it were, of the force of polarity.  Sensuous elements sustain their identity, 
magnet-like, through the attraction-and-repulsion of polar opposites. This 
fundamental rhythm we make out through the ceaseless bombardment of our 
sensorium by these Elemente.  Sensation is the mere inarticulate feeling of their 
presence, or rather, of their “penetration” of the sensorium -  the key idea in Goethe's 
doctrine of sentience.  A few months before he died he noted in his Diary: “If only 
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one could become sufficiently penetrated by the micro-megic of Nature, one would 
attain soon enough to many a concept” (11 June 1831).    
The body is, then, not simply an instrument of the rational will – as, say, it appears in 
Kant's moral philosophy. The body for Goethe is the site of our sensuous interactions 
with the      “external” world, and as such the necessary medium of our knowledge: “it 
is astonishing,” he writes to Frau von Stein from Italy (1 February 1787), “how 
difficult it is to learn to see without using one's own hand.” What grows out of his 
experience of nature and observation of her products – and this is crucial to the 
coherence of his “sensuous-intellectual” theory of knowledge – is what he calls a “a 
way, a technique of sensing” (Sinnesweise; Goethe 1982, 13:41). And in the last 
significant letter of his life (to Wilhelm von Humboldt, 17 March 1832) he is still 
insisting on the importance for human happiness of acquiring as soon as possible “a 
craft, skill, some kind of art” (Handwerk, Kunst). What he has in mind is close to 
what Edward Bullough calls “technical memory” (Bullough 1957, 145). The senses 
have, after all, developed in and for the external environment: “the eye has light to 
thank for its existence” (Goethe 1982, 13:323). They are, then, themselves techniques 
of the body, developed to cope with sensate stimulus. Traces of the impacting object 
(Goethe is fond of highlighting the etymology of the German word for “object”, 
Gegenstand – “something standing [over] against”) – are left in the muscular, tactile, 
kinetic memory, and these constitute the medium in and through which the mind 
works. Goethe posits a regulative faculty at work – one he himself experienced, 
enabling him to see with his mind’s eye the growth of plants he had earlier 
studied – a faculty that co-ordinates all other faculties (including “reason” in its 
usual sense): 
 
Here the phenomenon of the after-image, memory, productive 
imagination, concept, and idea must all be in play at once, and be 
manifest in the living organ of perception, with complete freedom, and 
without purpose or guidance. (Goethe 1919, II, 11, 283)  
These traces of the surface of things – “after-images” (Nachbilder) Goethe sometimes 
calls them – are the residue of physical contact left in the form of techniques, in the 
sense of habituated responsive adjustments by the organism in its passive-active 
confrontation with matter.  These physical adjustments have (relatively simple) form 
– “sentience gives to imagination clearly circumscribed, definite forms (Gestalten)”, 
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he writes to Maria Paulowna, 3 January 1817.  This fact accounts for the 
“charm”(Reiz) that natural phenomena exert (Goethe 1982, 13:255). In a wholly 
characteristic transformation of the Pre-Socratic metaphysical dictum that “depth 
speaks unto depth”, Goethe lends the formulation specific content: “form (Gestalt) 
speaks to ‘forms of like form’ (gleichgestalteten) ” (Goethe 1919, II, 46:276; cf. 
Goethe [1907] 1976, 103).4  What we, as (admittedly highly complex) forms, need do 
is “eavesdrop” on nature (Goethe 1982, 13:36). For Nature “deigns to speak to … 
senses, known, ignored, unknown” (ibid. 315-6). These “elements” penetrate us in the 
sense that they leave their traces in our senses in the form of fixed, physical 
adjustments, isomorphic with their elemental shape; such after-traces can barely be 
controlled, and exercise “human mind, cunning, and courage”:  they are 
“arbitrariness” itself (Willkür); and if it were not for the fact that we register the 
polarity that animates them, we should not have a clue as to their nature (Goethe 
1919, II, 12:102-3). Being so near to elemental Nature – being in it and of it –   
sentience is ruled by Nature. Therefore, sentience, in order that some degree of 
complexity may be grasped, “raises itself to imagination” which, though distanced 
from Nature is, in its workings, nonetheless very close to her (Goethe 1947, 1, 
10:251).  
In the case of human perception, then, a faculty (itself a mental technique) is 
developed, according to Goethe, to accommodate the sensuous in-rush, and to co-
ordinate the more localized techniques – “senses” – developed to deal with it 
immediately. This faculty, he variously refers to – reflecting both its genesis and its 
multi-functioning – as the “sense-power” (Sinnkraft), or the Memory, or the 
Imagination. Like the sense-organs, the faculties, too, have a genetic history in which 
they took their form in functional response to Nature, and, as such, their form and 
function retain the impress of Nature. In that sense, Imagination is “more akin” to 
Nature than our senses because as a faculty it has retained more of the complexity of 
Nature's working by dint of co-ordinating at a higher level a multiplicity of lower-
order sense-organs (ibid.). In contrast to the intellectual faculties of Reason and 
Understanding, which are too distant, and the senses, which are too close, 
Imagination, in its “productive,” aesthetic modality5, is at the optimal distance from 
                                                 
4 Cf. Gardner 1979, 136: “asymmetry begets asymmetry.” 
5 Goethe, like Schiller, distinguished not only between different modalities of the imagination, but also 
between those of aesthetic experience. The aesthetic also operates in three different modalities: there is the 
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Nature.  But what inspires Goethe’s trust in this faculty, not only in art but in science, 
with its tendency, as Francis Bacon has it, to “exceed the measure of nature, joining at 
pleasure things which in nature would never have come together … making unlawful 
matches and divorces of things”? (Gilbert and Kuhn 1939, 219). It seems especially 
odd in view of the “arbitrary” nature of the elemental traces imagination is appointed 
to govern. The answer brings us into the very heart of Goethe's scientific endeavour, 
to that nodal point where he seeks to justify his having deployed his artistic gifts in 
the service of the investigation of nature. Imagination may seem to have no rules, but 
it in fact obeys aesthetic judgement – “which is the way Reason masters all matter, all 
elements” (Goethe 1919, II, 46:396). Aesthetic experience, then, is the indirect way 
by means of which (“subjective”) Idea and (“objective”) Experience converge. 
Goethe’s trust in imagination stems from two aspects of its workings: first, 
imagination works with after-images which are as close as we ever get to nature's 
materiality; second, in its aesthetic modality, imagination works with every other 
faculty. Just as the Newtonian scientist depends on the inter-subjectivity of the 
scientific community to test the objectivity of data, so, Goethe is suggesting, the 
inter-faculty testing of the products of imagination gives grounds for relying on this 
co-ordinating, faculty, which when functioning alone, admittedly, cannot achieve 
“truth” and “integrity” (see his letters to Frau von Stein, 7 November, and to the 
                                                                                                                                            
“subordinate” role that Schiller envisages for the aesthetic as the prime matter, as it were, on which the 
intellect goes to work in order to produce concepts and theory; there is the “co-ordinate” role as direct 
object of enjoyment; and there is its “superordinate” role in gracious living (Wilkinson & Willoughby 2002, 
233-68).  In this third case, a “Third Realm” (or, to use a biological analogy, an ambient) is envisaged by 
Schiller, one created by interlacing the texture of those outward, physical, and observable aspects of milieu 
and person that are in any case already subordinate to purposeful action: a perceptible aesthetic form is 
thereby created, one that clothes and sustains activity and on to which ― as on to any aesthetic object ― the 
free and dynamic play of the inner life can be projected and released.  
Symbolic expression is, therefore, not only possible, on this theory, within the privacy of one’s own inner life 
or in the communal sharing of artistic appreciation. It is also at work in the manner and style of any and all 
public actions. Schiller does not share the post-Kantian Idealist’s faith in Geist, in the sense of a Reason to 
which Nature is to be subjugated. It is true that the sense in which Kant is an “Idealist”, in holding that an 
Idee (a Vernunftbegriff – a “concept of reason”) may regulate reality, is also Schiller’s, and Schiller also uses 
the word ideal, beyond the ordinary notion (of perfection), to mean “having existence only as an idea”; but, 
since on his and Goethe’s theory, Art articulates Geist (only as a synonym for Gehalt – “felt import”) in the 
broad sense of “the inner life” (das Innere), “Kunst des Ideals” (“ Ideal Art”, Aesthetic Education, Letter II, 
paragraph 3 & Letter XXVII, paragraph 1) is not “perfect art”, nor is it “intellectual art” (presenting a 
concept of reason), but art replete with significant (i.e., symbolic) import. It is this insistence that the  
import (Gehalt) of art and of all aesthetic phenomena is more than intellectual, even if its material (its 
Inhalt) is wholly or partly intellectual, that distinguishes the “Idealism” of Weimar Classicism from that of 
those Romantics who subordinate Art to Philosophy (and Religion). 
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Herders, 10 November 1786). Within the mind, during aesthetic experience, the 
imagination “penetrates” every other faculty.6
Aesthetic experience reveals the real world  – for all its elemental dynamism  –   to be 
ordered by similarly rhythmic patterns as are at work within us: in the same way as 
we feel tension, intensity, and resolution (Polarität, Steigerung, Spezifikation), so the 
universe, too, evinces these processes. If art can hold up the mirror to this otherwise 
inexpressible life within us, why, Goethe is asking, should it not be helpful to turn the 
principles, learned about art through practice and theory, outwards on to nature, and 
so complement a one-sidedly analytic approach? But, unlike say Schelling, Goethe is 
not seeking any kind of transcendence in  his  science:7 Nature's incredibly complex 
processes are seen to be utterly unlike the logical structure of “Ideas”; if they are like 
anything, it is the complex processes at work within human beings, but at a much 
more primitive level than rationality. Goethe's injunction to the natural scientist is “to 
seek nothing behind phenomena” (“nichts hinter den Phänomenen suchen”; Goethe 
[1907] 1976, 116). The attempt to reach with mind what can only be achieved through 
bodily means is the very cause of that most Romantic of maladies, nostalgic longing 
(Sehnsucht). Admittedly, once a cycle of investigation has resulted in the perception 
of the “laws” governing a phenomen's self-sustaining existence, a feeling of awe 
supervenes.     The living order apprehended in the particular leads to reflexion on the 
whole of which the    particular is but a part; and the particular aesthetic perception 
may well serve as an analogue of the whole, enabling the researcher to engage in that 
intellectual love of God that Spinoza held consisted in an insight into the dependence 
of all things on the whole of nature. Such sublime speculations are not, however, part 
of aesthetic experience proper; rather they are its possible by-product, leading, as 
Spinoza's phraseology suggests, to intellectual development rather than to directly 
renewed observation. The aesthetic perception of nature remains an earthly symbol, 
reflecting back to human observation, an analogue of human feeling: “forms speak to 
forms” (ibid. 208). The revelation of pattern in the object is at once a revelation of 
self; but not a fusion such as a mystic might seek in loss of individuality.8 Rather it is 
                                                 
6 For a fuller account of the epistemological foundations of Goethe’s science, see  Seamon & Zajonc, i-
x and passim; Stephenson 1994, 54-64. 
7 See Adler 1998, whose stress on the mutual enrichment of the Goethe-Schelling relationship in no 
way contradicts recognition of their fundamental conceptual divergence; cf. Stephenson 1994, 27-31. 
8 When Goethe speaks, in conversation with Eckermann (13 February 1829), of “the divinity that 
manifests itself in Urphänomenen, both physical and moral”, he is expressing his own personal 
conviction, not a necessary entailment of his scientific method. 
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more like the intensification of self experienced in reciprocated human love: its 
objectivity – like the reality of love for those involved – is unquestionable: it consists, 
quite blatantly, in its having the defining characteristic of all living form (Gestalt), a 
palpable sensuous, bodily existence. 
The onward march of exact science can do no harm to the progress of what we might 
call Goethe's “Science by Acquaintance” so long as there are individuals willing to 
practise it. So long, that is to say, as the Platonizing tendencies of Western thought do 
not become so all-powerful that the abstract Universal wholly displaces experience 
of the concrete Particular, and is mistaken for reality. When he speaks of 
“identity” he has in mind, as he strives to make his exquisitely expressive language 
show, not the Platonic universal, but the unique, distinguishing patterns of individual 
organisms, overlapping across species and genera, without any individual therein 
losing its individuality (Goethe 1982, 13:164).  When he speaks of  “the universal” 
(das Allgemeine) he is exploiting the very form of the German word: “all-common”, a 
ubiquitous rhythm of contrasts, one that characterizes without homogenizing. Only in 
this sense can he endorse Aristotle's alignment of the two poles of  the philosophical 
pair, universality and particularity: “the particular eternally succumbs to the universal, 
and the universal eternally has to adapt itself to the particular” . . . “the universal and 
the particular coincide: the particular is the universal appearing under varying 
circumstances” (Goethe [1907] 1976, 49, and 115). 
Goethe is not simply making the metaphysical point that each term in the pair is a  co-
implicate of the other.  He is saying more: that both, qua conceptual terms, are 
inadequate to the perplexing complication that characterizes real entities-in-
interaction in Nature. The harmony Nature achieves is not a bland, neat, set of 
equivalences; it is, like the harmony of great art, an asymmetrical co-ordination of 
opposites: “equilibrium in inequality, opposition of similarity, harmony of the 
dissimilar” (Goethe 1982, 12:133).  In Goethe's universe, there are no perfect Forms; 
only beautifully-formed imperfections. 
 
 
The potential cultural benefits of Goethe's way of “eavesdropping” on nature are very 
considerable. Increasingly, since the Renaissance, the mechanistic world-view has 
furnished Western culture with the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm of what 
constitutes scientific knowledge. As Ernst Cassirer puts it, the mechanistic cosmology 
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“has become the medium within which the human spirit has developed its own self-
knowledge” (Cassirer 1932, 48).  Even the historical approach has become a 
neglected aspect of the equipment of the scientist, indeed of many non-scientists, 
prompting a prominent historian to call for a “stereoscopic vision,” combining 
genetic-diachronic with ontological-synchronic modes of thought (Bullock 1990, 27).9  
Such a blending of simultaneity and succession, so congenial to himself, Goethe 
declared, would seem like insanity to the positivistic mind (Goethe 1982, 13:32).   
Indeed, to the mind nurtured in a mechanistic medium – the modern mind, according 
to  Cassirer – Goethe's insistence on the difference between mere “detail” (dismissed 
by conceptual thought) and the unique particular (available only to aesthetico-
sensuous apprehension), obvious enough to anyone familiar with the arts, would, he 
claims, seem nonsensical: “anyone born and educated in the so-called exact sciences 
will not easily grasp from the heights of his rational intellect (Verstandesvernunft) that 
there can be such a thing as an exact-sensuous imagination (without which art would 
be inconceivable)” (ibid. 42). The coinage, “Understanding-Reason” 
(Verstandesvernunft) forcefully expresses the climactic, somewhat abstruse, 
precarious, heights reached by one-sidedly rational-abstract training. “From the 
heights of reason the whole of life looks like a serious illness”, Goethe told C.G. 
Voigt in conversation (19 December 1798) “and the world looks like a 
madhouse.” Aesthetic symbolization,  in Goethe’s view, counters the deplorable 
cultural tendency fostered by one-sided intellectual development to see real life 
and the real world as unbearably inadequate. For him as for Schiller, “Gestalt 
always connotes formal relations as they are perceived in some actual [literal] 
phenomena”, whereas “form, by contrast, […] connotes formal relations after 
they have been abstracted from particular phenomena, or as they are conceived 
in the mind prior to their embodiment in some medium”. 10
 
If the increasingly widespread cultural opposition to a qualitative approach to nature 
is to be countered, a medium has to be found, or devised, in which the insights gained 
in aesthetic perception could be transmitted in a way that appeals not only to the 
intellect.  Because, by virtue of its particularity, the occasion of Anschauung is 
                                                 
9 For a clear account of Goethe’s own theory of history, see Nisbet 1998.  
10 See Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters, ed. and trans. by Elizabeth 
M.Wilkinson and L.A.Willoughby [1967] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p.309. 
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unique, it can never simply be repeated, only re-enacted with a degree of variation 
(though this is kept to a minimum in experimentation). The problem of the 
communication of what is not susceptible of discursive expression – the Urphänomen 
– is a problem with which Goethe wrestled from at least his discovery of the “primal 
plant” (Urpflanze) in 1787. While “there is no substitute for the direct perception of 
the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality” (Whitehead 1926, 248), there is, 
both Goethe and Whitehead insist, a means available for fostering such apprehension 
of the self-manifesting Urphänomen, namely aesthetic education. 
In characterizing Goethe’s Farbenlehre as “the novel of European Thought,” Thomas 
Mann  highlights two related aspects of Goethe’s scientific writing, each of which 
accounts for its abiding importance (Mann 1948, 40): on the one hand, Goethe’s 
deliberate, self-conscious placement on his own work within the whole length of the 
history of western science; on the other, the literary quality of his writings on nature. 
The reader is encouraged by Goethe’s employment of a metaphorical language 
couched in the figurative use of the simplest operations of nature, such as polarity to 
“see” with the mind’s eye what the scientific  experimenter has observed with the 
physical eye (Goethe 1982, 13:488-93): “if [a book that deals with natural 
phenomena] is to be enjoyed, if it is to be used, then nature must be present to the 
reader, either in reality or in vivid imagination” (Goethe 1982, 13:321).  Besides its 
imitative and productive functions the faculty of imagination has (Goethe to Knebel, 
21 February 1821), a third modality, “a circumspect power of imagination, which, 
while receiving a communication, looks about itself, grasping identities and 
similarities, in order to confirm what is being said”. By means of what he calls “a 
mode of presentation in conformity      with nature” (eine naturgemässe Darstellung; 
Goethe 1982, 13:31), Goethe seeks to appeal to this capacity, enabling his reader to 
store the impressions thus gained in memory, until they yield for the reader what they 
have yielded for the original observer. Given Goethe’s acute awareness of the severe 
limitations of language in expressing natural and aesthetic process, it is hard to accept 
that all he had in mind, as critics have suggested (Fink 1991, 50), is the deployment of 
rhetorical figure, in conjunction with his overtly narrative representation of both 
observation and growth. 
When he laments, as in his letter to Frau von Stein, 9 July 1786 (as he so often does 
throughout the length of his scientific and cultural writings; e.g., Goethe 1982, 
13:103) an   inability on his part to communicate precisely what he has so joyfully 
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experienced, he clearly has more in mind than the rhetorical mastery of figures of 
thought and speech, however precise. In his own case, all reasoning transforms itself 
into a kind of presentation (Darstellung) as he contemplates the form and colour of 
the world (Goethe to Schiller, 15 November 1796). To reproduce this effect in his 
reader, he needs to exploit more than method and manner. To induce in his reader a 
state of mind in which thought and perception become   one, Goethe’s presentation 
must re-enact, in its very style, this co-ordinated equilibrium, something entirely 
foreign to discursive language, however metaphorical and however evocative, because 
discourse appeals first and foremost through meaning (through concept) making its 
imaginative effect a secondary, subordinate matter (“mere metaphors” as Goethe 
dismissively puts it in the Farbenlehre [Goethe 1982, 13:492]). As he claims in his 
essay, “Simple Imitation of Nature, Manner, and Style” of 1789, style rests on the 
deepest fundaments of knowledge, on the very things themselves, in as far as we are 
permitted to know them in visible and tangible forms (Gestalten; Goethe 1982, 
12:32). Martin Walser has argued that “we owe the awakening of the German 
language [to] Goethe’s insistence on vision, on what one feels, perceives” (Walser 
1989, 36). Certainly, it is through the revivification in and through powerfully 
aesthetic language – in a word, through literature – that Goethe recreates for his reader 
the delight of participating in natural creativity. And the long historical dimension that 
he evokes, not only in his pioneering Geschichte der Farbenlehre, but throughout his 
cultural and scientific writings, is an attempt on his part to bring home to his reader 
his own conviction that such intimate experience of Nature, as of  Art, is directly 
proportionate to our grasp of the potentialities inherent in our culture. As in Faust, 
recognition of the diachronic temper of his theory of culture is crucial: in order to 
uncover ever greater significance in perceived reality, we must increasingly build the 
symbolic riches of our cultural inheritance into our everyday perception (see 
Stephenson 2001, 244-47).  Or, as he puts it in his West-östlicher Divan: 
           
    Who of three thousand years 
     An account is unable to give, 
     Remains in the dark without experience 
     And must a trivial existence live. (Goethe 1982, 2:49) 
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In a barely veiled attack on his contemporary, the physicist Albrecht Haller, in a poem of 
1820, the opening stanza highlights the cant-phrase “into the inner world of Nature” (taken 
from a philosophical poem of Haller’s published in 1730): 
             
               “Into the inner world of nature” –  
                 Oh, you philistine! 
                “Penetrates no created spirit.” 
                 The likes of us 
                 You don’t need to remind 
                 Of  such words: 
                 We think that, wherever we are, 
                 We’re always already in the midst of nature. (Goethe 1982, 1:359) 
Useful only as rhetorical expedients, spatial metaphors are utterly misleading if taken 
to be accurately descriptive of nature (Goethe 1982, 13:43).  For that reason he 
chooses Propylaen as the title for the cultural periodical he launched in 1798, because 
the Greek term denotes the room between inner and outer, the border-line, as it were, 
at which natural processes have their being (ibid. 12:38).  Nevertheless, he relies upon 
spatial tropes himself quite heavily, remarking that “everything that has to confront 
life, everything that is to be actively effective, must have a covering skin” (Hülle; 
ibid. 59).  For all his reservations, he is clear that science must have a language at its 
disposal that enables it to talk about problems in manageably practical ways.  
In an essay of 1823, appropriately entitled Problems, he insists that, while it is 
impossible to represent in expositional, didactic language the ubiquitous simultaneity 
of oppositional forces at work in nature, one can yet envisage an “artificial discursive 
practice” which could intimate at least something of it, beyond the limitations 
necessarily imposed by our inveterate tendency to one-sidedly visual metaphor, and 
hence to abstraction: “We really have to entertain the introduction of an artificial 
discursive practice (ein künstlicher Vortrag). A new symbolism would need to be put 
in place. But who would do it, and who acknowledge it if it were (ibid. 36)?” 
Whatever else this symbolism might consist in, it would need to match in some degree 
the subtle delicacy of connectedness that characterizes Nature’s syntheses; only then 
would it count as the longed-for “representation according to Nature” (naturgemässe 
Darstellung; ibid. 313). Rhetoric, he remarks (Goethe [1907] 1976, 120), is as 
careless of qualitative values as is mathematics. While he is intensely aware of the 
need to present his material in such a way that is will be placed in its proper historico-
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rhetorical context (writing, for example, on the history of both the manuscript and the 
printed version of his Metamorphosis of Plants), he never gives the slightest 
indication that his undoubted mastery of (mainly spatial) rhetorical and dialectical 
strategy is anything other than an approximation to the reality he is seeking to 
communicate.  Analogy, for example, he uses to considerable effect, as has often been 
noted.  But he is under no illusion that analogy, “which, like good company, 
stimulates rather than gives anything” (Goethe [1907] 1976, 211-12), is symbolic, in 
the highest sense in which an Urphänomen is symbolic. All formulae derived from 
human evaluation, he regrets to say are “mere likenesses” (blosse Gleichnisse; Goethe 
1982, 13:492). Like the visual aids of illustrative drawings and colour-plates, which 
he provides in many of his scientific texts, they are merely supportive correlatives of 
discourse, helpful but in no way sufficient (Goethe [1907] 1976, 47).  They, like all 
comparisons, are the product of, and a support to, the imagination in its “circumspect” 
function, not in its symbolic, productive mode (Goethe to Knebel, 21 February 1821).  
Even the very best metaphors (he adds in the same letter) only seem to cover the 
object in hand. His criticism of Descartes’s account of colour does not turn on the 
regrettable “crudity” of the metaphors that he employs; Goethe’s point is more 
substantial: 
 
Descartes does not seem to dwell in the objects peacefully and lovingly in 
order to gain something from them. He snatches at them in haste as 
soluble problems, and approaches them mainly from the angle of the most 
complicated phenomena. (Goethe 1982, 14:111) 
Above all, according to Goethe, Descartes lacks the (aesthetic) imagination-at-a-
distance that, in Goethe’s view, is essential. As a result he seems to lack any 
symbolic resource. Even the most appropriate metaphors of all, those of polarity 
(Goethe, 1982, 13:493), only “come close” to nature; they are “near-relatives” 
(nahverwandt); but their rhetorical effect is one of “relief” not expressive fulfillment 
(ibid. 316). Likewise his decision, in the face of the impossibility of articulating the 
“character” of a phenomenon (Wesen), to tell instead the “story” of its growth and 
development is, as he is very well aware, as much an inadequate approximation as any 
other discursive gambit: 
For strictly speaking we try in vain to express the intrinsic   
             character of a thing.  All that we become aware of are effects, 
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and a complete history of these effects would at least presumably  
             comprise the character of that thing. (Ibid.315) 
The narrative mode of exposition has certain advantages that he is keen to exploit. It 
places scientific investigation firmly in the socio-cultural world, and its history, 
leaving the laboratory with its strained artificialities behind; and, perhaps above all, it 
evokes the everyday world of human feeling and valuation, and brings the reader into 
that relationship with nature that Goethe dubs “ethical” (sittlich), by which he means 
“in terms of human values” seeing it as a prerequisite for the kind of science, indeed 
culture in general, for which he stands. But, the language of the theatre employed 
throughout the Theory of Colours, like the dramatic rhetoric of his account of the 
growth of our sense-organs, for all its evocative power, merely points to, indicates, a 
great experience, which itself remains off-stage and untold. Aesthetic experience can 
be represented only by aesthetic experience. The presence of the Urphänomen must 
be felt in its representation. Poetry is a re-symbolization of a primary symbolic event, 
and as such a “presentation according to nature”. For this reason Goethe included 
quite a few poems in his scientific writings, at moments when discursive language had 
reached its limit. A good example of these scientific-philosophical poems is the 
following, first published in Goethe’s journal Zur Morphologie in 1820: 
                     
                        PARABASE 
1. Freudig war, vor vielen Jahren 
2. Eifrig so der Geist bestrebt, 
3. Zu erforschen, zu erfahren, 
4. Wie Natur im Schaffen lebt. 
5. Und es ist das ewig Eine, 
6. Das sich vielfach offenbart; 
7. Klein das Grosse, gross das Kleine, 
8. Alles nach der eigen Art. 
9. Immer wechselnd, fest sich haltend; 
10. Nah und fern und fern und nah; 
11. So gestaltend, umgestaltend – 
12. Zum Erstaunen bin ich da. (Goethe 1982, 1:358) 
A full reading of this poem is not called for in the present context. What is of 
importance here is the way in which a scientific “idea” – better, an aesthetic insight 
into an Urphänomen – is re-enacted in the body of language. What is made manifest  
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to our senses and our mind (our imagination, in the productive, aesthetic sense that 
Goethe employs) is a tension between, on the one hand, the neat symmetry of 
intellection operating through linear time and, on the other hand, the awe-inspiring 
asymmetry of the ever-changing, yet recurring, patterns of nature.11 What is at work 
in the German text is that “style” Goethe held could be learned, like any technique or 
skill, in intercourse with nature: the co-ordination of semantic values with the very 
bodiliness of language, its sound and look and shape. In the first four lines, 
intellectual experience, for example, is made to look and feel like a linear process by 
means of the perceptible parallel of line three: “to research, to experience” (zu 
erforschen, zu erfahren). Here the two phrases in German are almost identical in 
sound-look structure; it is this, not any association of discursive meaning, that makes 
them seem to be (almost) equal stages in the process of natural investigation. This 
apparent symmetry of time-bound intellectual activity then gives way to the 
asymmetrical dynamism of Nature. The chiasmus of the seventh line is, in its 
sensuous linguistic shape, defective: each leg of the figure, “small, small, big, big” 
(klein, Kleine, Grosse, gross) is marred by one element’s having an  ‘e’ that its partner 
lacks: the perfect mirroring effect of the chiasmus is thereby blurred. In the 
penultimate line, the polyptoton, “shaping-reshaping” (gestaltend, umgestaltend), 
again links antithetical terms in a way which, because of the intrusive particle “um” in 
the heavily stressed position after the caesura, feels (sounds and looks) out of balance. 
But, if this is all that there is to “presentation according to nature”, the problem 
remains acute. For the space at the centre of Goethe’s didactic exposition would 
remain empty, except for a few magnificent philosophical poems which he could, and 
did, publish in quite unscientific contexts.  His scientific writings thus might well 
seem to fail his own test of adequate testimony – if it were not for the evidence, in the 
prose itself, of a definite aesthetic stylization. In order to reconcile literary intention 
with his clear communicative purpose, it  is necessary, as I have argued elsewhere, to 
adduce the theory of “aesthetic discourse” (schöner Vortrag)  that Schiller developed 
during his collaboration with Goethe.12 Two distinct modes of language are combined 
into one in what Schiller calls schöner Vortrag. There is the conceptual structure, in 
                                                 
11 A prose translation here of Goethe’s poetic writing may help bring out some of the significant points: 
“Many years ago, my mind was exercised, joyfully and eagerly, in researching and experiencing how 
Nature lives by its own creativity.  And it is the eternal One that reveals itself in manifold forms: small 
is the great, and great is the small, everything according to its own character. Ever-changing, 
preserving itself; near and far and far and near; thus shaping, reshaping: I am here to marvel.” 
12 See  Stephenson 1983, 157-208, and Stephenson 2002, 34-35. 
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which other, non-conceptual, features are subordinated to the logical relations 
(“logical” here in the Kantian sense of having reference to intellectual knowledge); 
and, on the other hand, there is the poetic in which conceptual relations are co-
ordinate with all others. These two modes – the logical and the aesthetic – themselves 
co-exist in a relation of reciprocal subordination, so that the reader may take the piece 
of discourse as either communicative or expressive depending on need and capacity. It 
is this reciprocally subordinative relation of logical and aesthetic that constitutes 
“aesthetic discourse” proper for Schiller (and Goethe), and that firmly distinguishes it 
from the complete fusion that occurs in poetry, where a purely co-ordinative relation 
is at work. This theory implies that the bodiliness of language (such as the inscape 
examined above in respect of the poem “Parabase”) has in aesthetic discourse a 
double function. It both establishes perceptible, sensuous links between terms (as in 
poetry) and serves to emphasise conceptual relations already established (as it 
traditionally functions in rhetoric). In the first case, the sensuous medium is co-
ordinate with the discursive meaning; in the second, subordinate to it. A sampling of 
Goethe’s literary and scientific texts will illustrate the point that, rather than the full 
assimilation to medium which the poems introduced into his scientific works 
represent, the only partial assimilation that constitutes schöner Vortrag is much more 
characteristic of his style in scientific and scholarly writing alike.    
The capacity of the German language to express, “in prose or poetry”, not only any 
object of discourse but also the felt life of the subject, had, Goethe remarked, reached 
in his lifetime the point where such articulation could be attained with ease (Goethe 
1963, 14:400). We should not, then, be surprised to find the combination of masterly 
evocative rhetoric and poetic co-ordination in his prose writings in general. For 
example, in commenting in 1816 on Ruysdael’s painting, The Convent, Goethe 
highlights the painting’s import as the representation of the Past in the Present, a 
thought which he embeds in the detail of his prose style: “The second picture”, he 
writes, “which has become famous  under the title of The Convent, has a similar 
intention in a richer, more attractive composition: to present the Past in the Present; 
and this is achieved most admirably, establishing the most vivid connexion between 
the dead and the living” (Goethe 1982, 12:139).13 The alliteration and  homeoteleuton 
                                                 
13 “Das zweite Bild, unter dem Namen des Klosters berühmt, hat bei einer reichern, mehr anziehenden 
Komposition die ähnliche Absicht: im Gegenwärtigen das Vergangene darzustellen, und dies ist auf das 
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in the original German, however, do more than underline the rhetorical chiasmus of 
Present (Gegenwärtigen)/Past (Vergangene)/Past (Abgestorbene)/Present 
(Lebendigen); they also fuse the apparently opposite elements into a perceptual nexus, 
into an aesthetic articulation of that “Eternal Moment” to which the fifth stanza of the 
poem “Vermächtnis” of 1829 (using similar techniques) gives classic expression: 
             Genieße mäßig Füll und Segen; 
Vernunft sei überall zugegen, 
Wo Leben sich des Lebens freut. 
Dann ist Vergangenheit beständig, 
Das Künftige voraus lebendig, 
Der Augenblick ist Ewigkeit. (Goethe 1982, 1:370)14
In the next passage, taken from the Introduction to his journal, Die Propyläen of 1798, 
it is likewise aesthetic interplay between the linguistic surface and the allusive 
rhetoric that fully articulates the nuances of Goethe’s thought: 
           One of the most striking characteristics of the decline of Art is the mixing-up                   
of  its different genres. The arts, like their genres, are related to one another, 
and have a certain inclination to unite, indeed to lose themselves in each other. 
But the duty, merit, and dignity of a genuine artist consists precisely in keeping 
the branch of art in which s/he works separate from others, in understanding 
how to establish each art, and every genre, in itself, and how to isolate it as far 
as possible. (Goethe 1982, 12:49)15
Working with a Kantian-Schillerian rhetoric of associated antitheses – “inclination” 
(Neigung), “duty” (Pflicht), “dignity” (Würde) – Goethe is out to make the point that, 
though  they are related, the different kinds of art should not be confused.  He 
concedes as fact that the arts and their sub-genres “incline” to coalesce (in that 
Verschmelzung Friedrich Schlegel famously championed in his 116th Fragment), 
while insisting on the Artist’s “duty” to keep them as distinct as possible. What is of 
particular interest here, from the stylistic point of view, is the way in which an intense 
                                                                                                                                            
bewundernswürdigste erreicht, das Abgestorbene mit dem Lebendigen in die anschaulichste 
Verbindung gebracht.” 
14 “Enjoy with moderation the fullness and blessings of this world; let reason be present wherever life 
enjoys life. Then the past is stable, the future alive in anticipation, and the moment is eternal.” 
15 “Eines der vorzüglichsten Kennzeichen des Verfalles der Kunst ist die Vermischung der 
verschiedenen Arten derselben. Die Künste selbst, so wie ihre Arten, sind untereinander verwandt, sie 
haben eine gewisse Neigung, sich zu vereinigen, ja sich ineinander zu verlieren; aber eben darin besteht 
die Pflicht, das Verdienst, die Würde des echten Künstlers, daß er das Kunstfach, in welchem er 
arbeitet, von andern abzusondern, jede Kunst und Kunstart auf sich selbst zu stellen und sie aufs 
möglichste zu isolieren wisse.” 
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impression is created, in the body of language, of this tendency to coalesce: anaphora 
links “connection” (verwandt), “unity” (vereinigen), and “loss” (verlieren), while 
homeoteleuton connects “relation-amongst” (untereinander) and “interrelation-in” 
(ineinander), and jingle on the little particle ei[n] brings “unity” (vereinigen), 
“inclination” (Neigung), “interrelation” (ineinander) and “relation-amongst” 
(untereinander) together. Unity is thus made to feel like entanglement. On the other 
hand, the participation (by virtue of its initial syllable in German) of “merit” 
(Verdienst) in this tangled web expresses the otherwise difficult-to-articulate idea, that 
an Artist’s merit consists in sustaining the tension of entering into the inclination of 
her/his chosen art-form to unite with others, while “as far as possible” sustaining its 
maximum autonomy.   
In his cultural commentaries, as in his writings on colour and on metamorphosis, 
Goethe on occasion draws attention to the aesthetic dimension of his prose by 
playfully juxtaposing poetry to it. In his “Well-Intentioned Reply” (Wohlgemeinte 
Erwiderung) of 1832, for instance, the (untranslatable) delicacy with which the advice 
is given to young writers, that the Muse is glad to accompany but unable to direct life, 
is contained in the enhancement of this antithesis by the polyptoton-play on the 
element, leite: “how difficult it is to get across to talent of every kind and every level 
that the Muses are glad to accompany, but do not know how to guide, life” (Goethe 
1963, 14:401).16 And, just in case, as it were, this  “heartfelt” sub-text has not been 
registered (namely, that though direct intervention is not to be expected of the Muses, 
guidance may be hoped for), Goethe ironically closes the prose piece with a little 
verse (Reimwort) in which the same aesthetic figure, and the same import, is 
emphatically repeated: “Young person! Remember at times when your mind and 
senses are elevated, that the Muses know how to accompany but not how to lead” 
(ibid:402).17
The case for Goethe’s awareness of the inherent instability of discursive language – because 
of its intrinsic abstraction, even on its most (illusorily) “concrete” levels – is very well 
                                                 
16 “Wie schwer ist es … dem Talente jeder Art und jeden Grades begreiflich zu machen: daß die Muse 
das Leben zwar gern begleitet, aber es keineswegs zu leiten versteht”(my emphasis).  
  
17 “Jüngling, merke dir in Zeiten, 
     Wo sich Geist und Sinn erhöht: 
     Daß die Muse zu begleiten, 
     Doch zu leiten nicht versteht.” 
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founded18. Goethe’s rhetoric deconstructs itself blatantly – indeed, shamelessly. His masterly 
deployment of evocative rhetoric serves to expose the unreality of the abstractions of 
conceptual thought: they appear crude and imprecise against the foil of perceptual vividness 
conjured up before the reader’s inner eye by the ‘poetic’ force of his simultaneously deployed 
aesthetic language. But, while it is true that the opening sentence of Goethe’s aphorism below 
does precisely articulate the self-referential, deconstructive, aspect of Goethe’s conception of 
“symbolic form” in the way Barbara Naumann in citing it suggests (Naumann 1998, 137), the 
aphorism as a whole also gives aesthetic expression to the nodal point of Goethe’s science:     
  
Everything factual is already theory: to understand this would be 
the greatest possible achievement. The blueness of the sky reveals 
to us the basic law of chromatics. But don’t go looking for  
anything behind phenomena: they are themselves what they teach, 
the theory. (Goethe[1907] 1976, 116)19
Naumann is surely right to see the seemingly paradoxical play between the “fact” and 
“theory” here as paradigmatic of both Goethe’s deconstructive tendency in general 
and in particular of the ludic semantics of his novel, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre 
(from which the aphorism is taken) – as the history of the scholarly controversy about 
the aphorism indicates.20 On the other hand, the sensuous contrast here between 
German words that seem indigenous and Fremdwörter (words borrowed from other 
languages, that continue to make a foreign impression) is exploited to aesthetic effect. 
Within the two distinct series of synonyms – those denoting the real world: 
“everything factual” (alles Faktische) / “the blue of the sky” (die Bläue des Himmels) 
/ “the phenomena” (die Phänomene); and a complementary group denoting the world 
of ideas: “theory” (Theorie) / “the basic law of chromatics” (das Grundgesetz der 
Chromatik) / “what they teach” (die Lehre) – there is a percetible contrast of sound 
                                                 
18 See Stephenson. 1994, 69-71, and 80-81; Cf.Naumann, 1998, 101 and Naumann, 1999, 576-78. 
19 “Das Höchste wäre zu begreifen, daß alles Faktische schon Theorie ist. Die Bläue des Himmels 
offenbart uns das Grundgesetz der Chromatik. Man suche nur nichts hinter den Phänomenen: sie selbst 
sind die Lehre.” 
20 For Willoughby. 1973, 108-09, the dictum is a formulation of the characteristic Kantian insistence 
that one must distinguish between things-in-themselves and the world of appearances..Willoughby 
points out that “it seems unlikely in view of Schiller’s prompt, and never shaken, recognition of the 
‘rightness’ of Kant’s epistemology, that he should have been unaware of the historian’s ‘construing’ 
activity vis-à-vis the recorded events of the past”, reinforcing his reading by pointing to Kant’s 
influence on Goethe as reflected in the opening sentence of the aphorism cited. By contrast, for Müller. 
1943, LXVIII, the maxim is an emphatic statement, not of Kant’s influence on Goethe, as Willoughby 
has it, but – on the contrary – of the “deep-seated divergence” between their respective epistemological 
positions. 
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and structure. The conceptual relations of intrinsicality, identity, priority, and 
reciprocity, articulated on the propositional level, undergo, on the aesthetic level, a 
subtle but profound change. The “foreignness” of ideas stands in marked contrast to 
the familiarity of actual experience. And then in the last term of each series there is a 
reversal of this pattern: a Fremdwort (Phänomene) designates the real world, while a 
German word (Lehre) designates the world of ideas. The aesthetic effect of all this is 
that a felt-thought is given expression, namely that “foreignness” of ideas is as much a 
part of experience as experience is a part of thought: what in propostional discourse is 
reduced to logical relations is here presented as the felt admixture that Goethe 
attempted to point to in the much-quoted paradox, “experience is but the half of 
experience” (nur die Hälfte der Erfahrung; ibid: 187). 
Here, in nuce, is the principle uniting Goethe’s science with his art: that of  “binary 
synthesis”, in which the name of one element in a pair of antitheses can fairly be 
applied to their synthesis, since it represents a richer concept, tending towards one of 
the original antitheses in an ascending hierarchy. For what is being expressed is the idée 
maîtresse that animates his whole scientific-cum-literary project, namely that 
“experience” is entirely compatible with “idea”;  indeed, that their co-operative 
interrelation, without the one ever  being confused with the other, is productive of ever-
ascending (binary) syntheses, which we may name, indifferently,  “EXPERIENCE” or 
“IDEA”, depending on whether we wish to stress one or other of the related elements in 
such higher synthesis (which the upper case here is meant to indicate). One of Goethe's 
fundamental contributions to his collaboration with Schiller consisted in the subtle 
modes of thought and presentation that he had developed over many years since he first 
became fascinated with hermeticism and “mystical-cabalistic chemistry” (Goethe 1982, 
9:414) and that    he went on to apply in his scientific work. Of particular relevance here 
is Goethe's (and later Schiller's) adoption and adaptation of a variation of the principle 
of coniunctio oppositorum, known as “binary synthesis” (see Cirlot 1962, 26, and 145-
47.), of which William James offered a precise analysis in a discussion of mystical 
modes of writing: 
The keynote [of this dark saying] is invariably a reconciliation. It 
is as if the opposites of the world … were melted into unity. Not 
only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same 
genus, but one the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the 
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genus and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. (James 
[1903] 1963, 374)21
The presenting-sympton of this habit of mind is Goethe’s Janus-faced, scientific-
literary, style, now communicative, now expressive, depending on his reader’s 
momentary needs. “The melody of the style” that Novalis praised so highly in 
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship Years may, then, also be “the true soul” (Novalis 
[1802] 1924, no. 1975), not just, say, of The Elective Affinities and Wilhelm Meister’s 
Journeyman Years, but of Goethe’s prose writing in general. The abnormal vigour 
that marks Goethe’s prose writing derives from exploiting his linguistic medium to 
the utmost. It is this deliberate preoccupation with the margins of discourse which 
recommends anew Goethe’s writing, both “literary” and “scientific,” to the attention 
of a generation of readers trained in the deconstructionist delights of postmodernist 
cultural liminality.22
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Although James wrote that such synthesis was “something like what the Hegelian philosophy 
means,” and ultimately assigned it a mystical status (“to me the living sense of its reality only comes in 
the artificial mystic state of mind”), his description applies more accurately to Weimar Classicism’s 
“binary synthesis”, and is not necessarily mystical at all. 
22 For a lucid account of “deconstruction” as the elaboration of the inherent logical instability of the 
apparently stable rhetorical distinctions marking   conceptual “borders” (“limen”), see Naumann 1998, 
12, 20, 101, 124, & 137. 
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